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Sles

BY RICHARD C. E.BECK

A forerspouse's income t ax liabilities can unexpectedly plague the
other spouse even years after a final
divorce, as most spouses are liable for
each other's taxes on income earned
during a marriage. The sources of such
liability are twofold. First, under Internal Revenue Code (O.R.C.) §6013(d)(3),
if a couple files a joint return, each
spouse becomes jointly and severally
liable for the full amount of tax due
on the couple's combined earnings.
Because nearly all couples file jointly,
almost every ex-spouse is exposed to
liability for an audit adjustment to the
other ex-spouse's taxes, as long as the
statute of limitations remains open for
the joint return year.
In community property (CP) states,
each spouse is liable for federal income taxes on one-half of the other's
CP income under the doctrine of Poe
v.Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930). Liability under Seaborn arises even when
the spouses file separate or no returns,
and it results automatically from residence in a CP jurisdiction.
Many experts believe that both
forms of liability are unjustified and
should be repealed. Recently, the ABA
Tax Section's Committee on Domestic
Relations fax Problems unanimously
recommended repeal, in the hope that
the ABA will officially adopt that position and persuade Congress to act.
In the meantime, we must live with
the law as it is.
Relief rules do exist for both forms
of liability for the "innocent spouse,"
discussed later, under certain limited
circumstances, but the rules are uncertain and inadequate. It is conservatively estimated that there are at least

10,000 instances a year that tax is collected from the "wrong" spouse (generally the woman), despite the
innocent spouse rules, and many involve substantial sums.
The income tax laws of many states
may also impose joint return liability
and/or CP tax liability. Many such
states provide innocent spouse relief
modeled on the federal rules, but the
relief rules may differ in detail. (California, for example, has especially
generous relief rules.)
Most taxpayers even those advised by accountants or attorneys-are completely unaware of having assumed their spouses' tax liabilities. The
wife's attorney should inform her in
particular about all aspects of this. Although both the joint return and CP
liability rules are gender-neutral, in
practice the vast majority of taxpayers
who are forced to pay their ex-spouses'
taxes are women. For simplicity, the
nonearning spouse will be referred to
here as the wife (W), and the earning
spouse as the husband (H), even
though occasionally it may be H who
must pay the tax on W's income.

joint return liability
More than 95 percent of married
couples elect to file jointly each year
to enjoy the tax savings that usually
result. Thus virtually all married persons (even in CP states) are subject to
joint return liability. Even if W earned
nothing during the taxable year, and
all the tax liability resulted solely from
H's income, the IRS may, and often
does, attempt to collect the entire tax
from W, sometimes years after the
parties are separated or divorced. Fur-
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ther, W's liability is not limited to the
tax stated on the return. She is also
liable for subsequent assessments due
to H's unreported income or disallowed deductions, and for interest and
penalties (except for the fraud penalty, for which actual fraud must be
proved against her personally). I.R.C,
§ 6653(b)(3)). The IRS is under no obligation to pursue Hfirst, and generally
chooses to collect from the spouse
from whom collection appears easier.
Also, W has no right to require the IRS,
or any tax forum, to join H as a party
in collection proceedings.
Innocent spouse rules
Under I.R.C. § 6013(e), W may obtain relief from liability for tax on certain items attributable to H, despite
having made a joint return with H, if
she can qualify as an "innocent
spouse." The statutory requirements
for relief are: if (A)ajoint return must
be made, W must prove (B)that there
is a "substantial understatement" on
the return, attributable to H's "grossly
erroneous items"; (C)that in signing
the return, W did not know, and had
no reason to know, that there was such
a substantial understatement; and (D)
that it would be inequitable under the
circumstances to hold W liable for the
deficiency attributable to such understatement. The burden of proof for
each of the above elements ison W.
Adams, 60 T.C. 300, 303 (1973).
A good defense
joint Election. The best defense is
that W did not file ajoint return in the
first place, and that I.R.C. § 6013(d)
does not apply. Whether the election
was made isa question of W's intent.
Even if W did not sign the return, the
return may be joint if there isevidence
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of her acquiescence. Hanesworth v.
U.S., 936 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1991). If
W signs under duress, the joint election is not valid. Pirnia, 60 T.C.M. 554
(1990). If the couple is not legally married, a joint return is invalid.
Grossly Erroneous Items. A grossly
erroneous tax item is either (A) income that has been omitted from the
tax return, or (B)a claim of deduction,
credit, or basis for which there is "no
basis in fact or in law." !.R.C. §
6013(e)(2). Thus, no relief is available
if H simply fails to pay the tax that was
correctly reported on his return. Nor
is relief available for items other than
omitted income, and disallowed deductions, credits, and claims of basis.
For example, there is no relief from
nonpayment of self-employment taxes.
Sivils, 86 T.C. 79 (1986).
Case law is confusing as to when
deductions have "no basis in fact or
law." It isclear that mere disallowance
is not enough to meet the test. Russo,
298 T.C. 28 (1992). The legislative history indicates that deductions that are
frivolous or phony do meet the test.
Anything in between mere disallowance and frivolous or phony deductions is uncertain. For example,
authorities are divided as to whether
partially disallowed tax shelter deductions qualify. Ness, 95A F.2d 1495 (9th
Cir. 1992).
Dollar Limits. An understatement
due to omitted income is "substantial" only if it exceeds $500 (net of
interest and penalties). I.R.C. §
6013(e)(3). Smaller amounts do not
qualify for relief. For erroneous claims
of deduction, credit, or basis, the dollar limits are more strict. If W's adjusted gross income (AGI) for the year
immediately preceding assessment of
the deficiency is $20,000 or less, the
tax understatement must not only be
larger than $500, but the tax liability
attributable to the understatement
must also exceed 10 percent of her
AGI. If W's AGI for that year is more
than $20,000, the tax liability must exceed 25 percent of her AGI. Note also
that if W has remarried, her new husband's income must be aggregated
with her own for purposes of determining "her" AGI; this is so even if W
and the new husband did not file a
joint return. I.R.C. § 601 3(e)(4)(D).

Fall 1992

The only way W can defend against
collection proceedings brought by the
IRS on the ground of joint return liability is through the innocent spouse
rules. For the limited effectiveness of
a tax indemnification agreement between H and W, see page 33.

Innocence
The burden of proof is on W to establish that she had no reason to know
of the grossly erroneous item(s). This
"innocence" requirement is the most
difficult to prove, and the most frequently litigated issue. If W is aware
of facts that ought to put a reasonable
person with her education and experience on notice that H may have
omitted income or overstated deductions, W has a duty to look into such
facts before signing the return. For example, awareness of large or unusual
expenditures has been held to put W
on notice about unreported income.
Also, W's involvement in H's business
affairs or in the family finances may be
deemed to put her on notice, if H's
tax delinquency was reasonably inferred from such involvement. W's
higher education, especially in business or accounting, and/or her independent business experience, has
sometimes been held against her, on
the ground that such experience ought
to give her greater awareness of her
tax responsibilities.
It has been held that large tax losses
on the return without any corresponding reduction in standard of living
should put W on notice. But the courts
have been inconsistent as to whether
W has a duty to review the tax return
in the first place. Compare Shapiro, 51
T.C.M. 818 (1986), with Hinds, 56
T.C.M. 104 (1988). How much inquiry
into such items is reasonable has also
been decided inconsistently. Compare Cohen, 54 T.C.M. 944 (1987), with
Price v. U.S., 887 F.2d 959 (9th Cir.
1989). A similar uncertainty clouds the
question whether W's good faith reliance on professional tax advice is
enough to exonerate W.
If H refuses to discuss his tax or financial affairs with W, that does not
in itself put W on notice, at least if the
refusal isa long-standing pattern of the
marriage. Estate of Weissbart, 63 T.C.M.
1845 (1992). An often-successful de-
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fense has held that H systematically
kept W in the dark as to his finances,
especially where W was dependent
and financially unsophisticated.
McCoy doctrine
A line of cases has held that where
W isaware of the existence of the underlying transaction, her ignorance of
the tax consequences does not constitute innocence. Where both W and
H were ignorant of the tax consequences, relief has been denied on the
questionable ground that W was not
misled by H. McCoy, 57 T.C. 732
(1972). On the other hand, inall cases
involving omitted income, W was still
living with H at the time of trial, which
may have been the unexplained
ground of decision. The "ignorance of
the law isno excuse" theory of McCoy
has been ignored in many decisions
granting relief when W was widowed
or divorced. See, e.g., Ratana, 662 F.2d
220 (4th Cir. 1981).
Taken literally, the McCoy doctrine
would preclude relief for all disallowed deductions, because W isnecessarily aware of the existence of the
item deducted on the return. The Tax
Court has rendered this strict interpretation, but in a case where W was still
married. Bokum, 94 T.C. 126 (1990).
Appeals courts have been more flexible in granting relief, and have held
that bare knowledge of the item's existence is not enough to preclude relief. W must be aware of at least some
questionable circumstances as well.
Erdahl, 930 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1991).
Equity
The question whether it would be
"inequitable" under the circumstances to hold W liable translates in
practice to whether W can demonstrate that she did not receive any significant economic benefit from the
unpaid taxes over and above ordinary
support. Both lifestyle during marriage
and property settlements at termination are relevant to the benefit test.
The courts have occasionally been lenient in finding that substantial property settlements do not exceed
ordinary support, especially in cases
where W has children to support. Terzian, 72 T.C. 1164 (1979). As with the
innocence issue, these cases are largely

irreconcilable in terms of the rules.
They turn upon their facts.

Sympathy
The sympathy test is not in the stat-

ute, but it is perhaps the most important factor of all. H's mistreatment or
abandonment of W is usually mentioned in her favor in reported decisions. Women who were homemakers
and mothers have received more sympathy in the Tax Court than have welleducated or independent women.
And, of course, it helps if W is poor
and has children to support. Conversely, it appears all but impossible
for W to obtain relief if she isstill living
with H at the time of trial. Treasury
Reg. § 1.6013-5(b) permits the court
to take into consideration whether W
was deserted or isseparated from H;
but the Tax Court sometimes seems
to consider separation or pending divorce a necessary element for relief.
Hunt, 62 T.C.M. 1238 (1991).

Reduce future exposure
Married couples are eligible to file
ajoint federal tax return if they are still
married on the last day of the taxable
year, whether or not they are separated, and even if they are already divorced at the time of filing. During
settlement negotiations, H will often
suggest that a provision be included
in the separation agreement requiring
the parties to file ajoint return for the
current or future years to achieve atax
saving. Counsel for W should exercise
great caution before agreeing to such
a request. The tax saving is usually
modest and benefits H more than W
because H is on average the higher
earner. But the risk from joint return
liability is borne primarily by W, and
may involve sums far in excess of the
tax saving. Even if the spouses negotiate to share the saving equally, W's
portion often isn't worth the substantial risk. There isno obligation to agree
to such arequest. A divorce court cannot force W to sign a joint return, because joint filing isavoluntary election.
Leftwich v. Leftwich, 442 A.2d 139 (D.C
Ct. App. 1980).
Counsel should be especially wary
of allowing W to sign joint returns for
prior tax years that are already delinquent. When there isany risk that H

will not pay the overdue taxes, counsel may be exposed to actionable malpractice. Newberry v.Johnson, 294 Ark.
455, 743 S.W.2d 811 (1988). Filing
separately avoids joint return liability
altogether.
Protect your client
A properly drafted separation agreement should specify which spouse is
obligated to pay contingent tax liabilities arising from joint returns for past
years, as well as for the current year.
But counsel should not be overly confident about the protection afforded
by such an indemnity clause: It is not
binding on the IRS, but the IRS may
pursue W notwithstanding the agreement. Buchine, 63 T.C.M. 1838 (1992).
An agreement will facilitate W's action
for indemnity against H in the event
that she isforced to pay the joint taxes.
But even without an indemnity clause,
all states provide W with an equivalent right of action for contribution under common law, and most states also
by statute, if she is forced to overpay
her share of the joint obligation. Bormaster v. Bormaster, 177 Kan. 1, 274
P.2d 757 (1954). Enforcing a tax indemnity provision may be impractical,
however, because of the litigation expense or because H is unable to pay
the judgment. Case reports for suits
for contribution are exceedingly rare.
Even if W is eventually successful in
her suit for contribution (or indemnity), having to pay the tax first may
be onerous. If her claim for reimbursement is uncollectible, she is not entitled to a bad-debt deduction, even if
she is a judgment creditor. Rude, 48
T.C. 165 (1967).
Mitigate exposure
The financial disclosure process of
the divorce action offers you a chance
to assess tax risks. If H is not cooperative, or appears deceptive about his
financial affairs, he has likely been
evasive in tax matters as well. Counsel
should exercise special care if H isselfemployed or manages a small business, particularly one in which transactions are primarily in cash, as such
businesses allow significant opportunity for tax avoidance or evasion.
Examine prior joint returns for warning signs of tax problems. Pay special
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attention to large partnership deductions and to any apparent discrepancies between prior reported income
and the family's standard of living. If
these signs appear, W should consider
laying the groundwork for a future innocent spouse claim. For example, any
tax indemnity clause contained in the
settlement agreement might recite that
W had no knowledge of, or involvement in, H's business or tax matters
for as many tax years as you can possibly include. (Remember that the
statute of limitations never expires for
tax fraud.) Similarly, if W's knowledge
of and participation in family financial
affairs was limited, it would be wise to
recite this in the agreement.
Such assertions are more persuasive
if they are documented before any audit or assessment. Recitations in the
signed agreement also help preclude
Hfrom testifying to the contrary inany
future innocent spouse litigation.
Document the source of any property
transferred from H to W, and avoid
accepting any property that might
have been derived from H's unreported income or from refunds from tax
shelter losses.
If H has outstanding unpaid tax liabilities from joint returns, W's counsel
should insist that they be paid or that
W be given appropriate security to
protect her in the event that she becomes obligated to pay the IRS.
Finally, make sure that W sends to
the IRS a notice of H's change of address as soon as he leaves the marital
residence. This will ensure that any future deficiency notice will be sent to
H, as well as to W, and may help direct
IRS collection efforts toward H. If H
has moved to a different IRS district,
however (there are 64 in the United
States), the IRS collection agent is still
likely to proceed against W if she appears able to pay, rather than transfer
the case to another district.
Note that under a recent IRS policy
change, collection personnel may (but
are not required to) pursue H first and
defer collection from W, if W makes
an innocent spouse claim and requests relief.

CP liability
Under Poe v. Seaborn, supra, a taxpayer who resides in a CP jurisdiction
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is liable for one-half of a spouse's income taxes incurred by earnings that
are treated as CP under applicable state
family-property law. Seaborn construed family property law in the CP
states as creating this liability, on the
theory that CP earnings during marriage are owned by and taxable to each
spouse in equal amounts. This form of
liability does not depend on filing a
joint return. It results automatically
from residence in a CP jurisdiction,
unless the couple elected not to live
under community property rules.
W's best defense is that the item of
H's income in question is not CP in-

come at all. Federal taxation of CP income depends on state law, and state
rules vary greatly as to which items
qualify as CP while the community remains in effect. (Income from separate
property, for example, is separate
property in some states, but it isCP in
others.) State law also varies significantly as to how and when the community may be severed by separation
of the spouses or by agreement. If H's
income was earned after the community was severed, liability under
Seaborn does not apply.
Current CP states include Arizona,
California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and
Wisconsin.

Dooley, 63 T.C.M. 1858 (1992).
Two other provisions allow relief
without proof of innocence, but they
suffer other shortcomings. None of the
I.R.C. § 66 provisions provide any relief for items other than omissions of
income. Nor is relief available for taxes
on CP investment income under I.R.C.
§ 66(a) and (b).
I.R.C. § 66(a) provides relief only if
the couple lived apart during the calendar year, and none of the earned
income in question was transferred
between them. Even one day of cohabitation during the year, or any payments (other than child support) that
are not minimal, will preclude relief.
I.R.C. § 66(b) provides that CP-law
benefits may be disallowed to any taxpayer who acts as if he alone is entitled to the community income and fails
to notify his spouse of the nature and
amount of such income before the due
date for the taxable year. The "benefit" in this situation is H's relief of tax
liability for one-half of his earnings. This
provision may be defeated if H notifies W of her liability, even if he transfers nothing to her.
The Seaborn doctrine does not apply to payroll taxes, which in principle
must be withheld infull. Although onehalf of H's wage withholding for fed-

Relief under I.R.C. § 66
The innocent spouse provisions for
relief from CP liability under I.R.C. §
66 are analogous in many respects to
relief under I.R.C. § 601 3(e). The rules
are more restrictive, however, and they
have often failed to prevent obviously
unfair results. The reported case law
shows that nearly all petitioners for relief under I.R.C. § 66 have lost. When
I R.C. § 66 was enacted, its revenue
cost was estimated to be "negligible";
the prediction has proved accurate.
I.R.C. § 66(c) is similar to I.R.C. §
6013(e) and contains the same requirements of "innocence" and "equity" discussed earlier. There are no
dollar limits, however, and the provision applies only to unreported income. The innocence test is nearly
impossible to meet, because if W
knows H was employed, she loses,
even though she may have no knowledge of the amount of his earnings.
Fall 1992
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eral income taxes is automatically
credited against W's tax liability, if H
deliberately underwithholds (or if
withholding is not required, as for dividends, interest, and capital gains), H
can in effect deliberately transfer liability for one-half of the resulting deficiency to W.

Indemnity
Where state law permits severance
of the community by voluntary action
or agreement, take the necessary steps
for severance as soon as possible.
Agreements to end the community are
respected for federal tax purposes if
valid under state law. Ending the community thus stops the clock on any
further tax liability. Schoenhair, 45
B.T.A. 576 (1941) (Arizona).
A tax indemnity clause in the property settlement agreement would be
useful, because (unlike under joint return liability) if W is forced to pay H's
taxes under Seaborn, she otherwise has
no right to reimbursement from H under state law. It is perhaps desirable as
well to include recitations to lay the
foundation for a future claim of innocence under I.R.C. § 66(c), but, as
noted earlier in this article, little reliance can realistically be placed on such
N
a claim.

